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of contemporary politics. At the same time, more narrow definitions of populism have become
shared in scholarship on the subject, nourishing more analytical approaches that put populism in
historical and cross-regional perspective. The purpose of this introduction is to use the evidence
assembled in this special issue to ask some fundamental questions concerning the study of populist
mobilization. Most importantly, what do we gain and what do we lose from sight by focusing on
the commonalities between parties based on their populist appeals, when populist parties differ
dramatically in terms of the substantive ideologies they adhere to? Are there distinctive features in
terms of voter attitudes that underlie populist mobilization? And if failures of political
representation and populism are intimately related, can we expect populists to render party
systems more responsive to voters’ substantive policy preferences?
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As populism seems to become ever more widespread in different regions of the world,
there is a growing consensus on a minimal definition of the phenomenon that centers on
its ideological traits. In Mudde and Kaltwasser’s (2013) terms, populism is a “thin
ideology” that builds on the juxtaposition of the elite and the people. Employing this
discourse enables charismatic leaders to mobilize citizens who no longer feel represented
by established political actors. The aim of this special issue is to gauge the contribution of
the concept of populism to our understanding of political mobilization in the recent period
and to compare these instances of populist mobilization to earlier ones. While more and
more phenomena are looked at through the lens of populism, it is important to know how
important this thin ideology is compared to the host ideologies that these parties or
movements almost invariably also exhibit, and thus how similar they really are. For
example, how much do we gain in looking at the populist radical right in terms of the
concept of populism, rather than theories from the established literature on the radical or
extreme right?
The growing consensus on what populism constitutes has the advantage of allowing for
comparisons across time and space. While populism can be associated with various more
substantive “host ideologies” such as socialism or cultural traditionalism and nativism, a
common definition allows us to compare its left-wing, right-wing, and more “pure”
manifestations that fail to exhibit clear-cut affinities to host ideologies. How far, then, do
the commonalities between left-wing and right-wing populist mobilization go? The aim of
this exercise is not to proclaim either the populism lens or more classical approaches as
superior to the other, but rather to contribute to a fruitful cross-fertilization or integration
of approaches. Certainly, in looking through the lens of populism, we should not forget
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everything we have learned when explaining more specific instances of populist
mobilization based on different approaches. Our efforts to understand the challenge posed
by new political actors – whether they are of a populist type or not – should be truly
cumulative.
This introduction is organized around five themes. I start by discussing the growing
consensus in understanding populism as a set of ideas, and use the contributions to this
special issue to take stock of the varied ways populist parties and movements have
conceptualized “the people” and “the elite” across space and time. I then go on to discuss
the relationship between populism and substantive ideologies, exploring the potential for
the populism approach and more traditional theories of party system change to fruitfully
nourish one another. The third section turns to the demand side of populism, and looks at
the distinctiveness of populist mobilization in terms of voter orientations, and how these
may contribute to our understandings of the social structural underpinnings of populism
on the left and right. This leads up to the final two sections that address the relationship
between populism and representation: If populism is a consequence of failures of political
representation, what are the consequences of the emergence of populist challengers for the
substantive representation of voters’ policy preferences? In the final section, I ask whether
different types of populist mobilization – those whose appeal is confined to specific
segments of the electorate as opposed to those capable of winning electoral majorities –
may have diverging effects on substantive political representation.
Putting Populism in Comparative Perspective
One part of the literature sees populism as a discourse or a distinctively top-down strategy
of political mobilization (e.g., Weyland 2001), or as in the vast literature on the radical
right, simply as an additional feature that specific party types use to mobilize voters. In a
similar vein, in their conceptual framework for understanding the “Left Turn” of the late
1990s and 2000s in Latin America, Levitsky and Roberts (2011: 12-13) highlight the
concentration of authority in the hands of a dominant personality as a distinguishing
feature of the populist left as opposed to other currents of the left. More recently,
definitions of populism have become both more demanding and more empirically precise.
Despite some remaining disagreement on whether populism is a “thin ideology” or simply
a type of discourse, much of the current research converges on what has been termed the
“ideational” approach to populism. Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser (forthcoming)
identifying the latter’s first central element as a dualistic worldview, a Manichean
juxtaposition between “the good” and “the evil”, or “the people” and “the elite”.
Furthermore, the people and the elite are seen as homogeneous entities, constituting
populism’s anti-pluralist ideological core that is reflected in the idea that politics should be
the expression of the “volonte generale” or the general will of the people, as argued by
Canovan (2002) and Mudde (2004: 543).1 Based on the success of populists’ discourse that
centers on the idea that “the people” has been betrayed by the “the elite”, the diagnosis of
the ideational approach is one of a generalized crisis of democratic representation that
makes citizens susceptible to being mobilized against a corrupt and self-serving elite (c.f.
Caramani 2017; Hawkins 2010; Hawkins et al. forthcoming; Mudde 2004; Mudde and
Rovira Kaltwasser 2013; Rovira Kaltwasser 2012). According to Rooduijn’s (2014)
analysis, being anti-elite, pro-people, conjuring up the homogeneity of the people, and
1 This illiberal element even constitutes the core of populism according to Pappas’ (2016) minimal definition.
302 Simon Bornschier
© 2017 Swiss Political Science Association Swiss Political Science Review (2017) Vol. 23(4): 301–312
cultivating a permanent crisis actually constitutes the smallest common denominator of the
various approaches to populism. The advantage of the ideational definition is thus that it
is both precise and encompassing enough to grasp those phenomena that researchers on
populism are most concerned with.
In this conception, populism is compatible with a range of distinct “host” or “thick”
ideologies that populism can cling onto (e.g., Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012). As
Meny and Surel (2000) have pointed out, “the people” can be defined in various ways,
namely, politically (the sovereign), culturally (the nation), or in economic terms (in
categories of class, but also in more recent forms such as “the hard working” as against
the lazy, and so forth), accounting for the malleable character of populism. Nonetheless,
the minimal definition offered by the ideational approach allows for a clear distinction
between populist and non-populist forms of mobilization in theoretical terms, as well as
for drawing the boundaries between populist worldviews and other manifestations of
democratic malaise such as political alienation, or lack of political trust (e.g., Hawkins
2010; Hawkins et al. forthcoming).
The contributions to this special issue attest to the basic commonalities in the
worldviews that populists evoke across time, from the 19th century to present, and space,
from Latin America, over Northern America to Southern and Northern Europe. Going
back to the 1970s, Manucci and Weber (2017, this issue) show that populism is a
cyclical phenomenon in the five Western European countries studied, and not something
that is characteristic of the most recent past. In his analysis of the antebellum “Know
Nothings” and the post-Civil War People’s Party in the US, and late 19th century
Boulangism in France, Betz (2017, this issue) shows that both populism and nativism are
old phenomena. They frequently, but not always go together. The broad temporal scope
of Betz’ analysis also reveals two additional important points: First, except for the case
of Boulangism, populist mobilization does not seem to require charismatic leaders, but
can also take the form of movements. This suggests that populism should indeed be
considered an ideology, rather than an organizational feature of parties or movements.
Second, populism and nativism are both highly malleable, and compatible with cultural
and economic causes. Specifically, nativism can be framed as a remedy both against
cultural threat, as well as socioeconomic anxieties. With respect to populism, the findings
presented by Ivaldi et al. (2017, this issue) point in a similar direction. While a reference
to “the people” is common to all the instances of populism they study, the French
Front National and the Italian Lega Nord define “the people” culturally in terms of
nationals as opposed to foreigners, while Podemos in Spain and the Movimento Cinque
Stelle (M5S, Five Star Movement) in Italy use a broader definition encompassing “the
underprivileged” or even simply the “common citizen”. Likewise, Huber and Ruth (2017,
this issue) argue that parties’ host-ideology determines the nature of the antagonism
between “the people” and “the elite”.
This does not mean, however, that populism is compatible with, or beneficial to any
other form of mobilization. Aguilar and Carlin’s (2017, this issue) analysis based on a
survey-experiment shows that even under the favorable conditions provided by the
widespread disenchantment with the political class in Chile, historical memories or
the extremeness of a candidate in terms of her host ideology may severely limit the
effectiveness of populist messages. We might recall that in the case of the radical populist
right in Western Europe, abandoning overt racism and instead adopting cultural
differentialism or ethno-pluralism (see Antonio 2000) constituted a necessary condition for
these parties’ capacity to mobilize more than marginal shares of the vote (e.g., Carter
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2005; Golder 2003; Ignazi 2002; Rydgren 2005). Aguilar and Carlin’s call for an effort at
theorizing the scope conditions of successful populist mobilization is therefore well put.
Populism and Substantive Ideologies
Journalistic accounts often reduce the success of political newcomers to their populist
appeals. But the evidence presented in the contributions to this special issue strongly
suggests that the substantive ideologies involved in populist mobilization matter a great
deal. This raises the question what we lose from sight by placing emphasis on the populist
element in the mobilization of challenger parties. Rydgren (2017), for example, warns us
that by analyzing the radical right in terms of populism, the ideological core of these
parties risks being lost from sight. The new radical right is clearly populist, “but these are
not the most pertinent features of these parties” (Rydgren 2017: 9). In fact, an earlier
literature identified the ideological core and explained the electoral success of these parties
in terms of authoritarianism, nationalism, nativism, and anti-universalism, or more
specifically their anti-immigrant positions, while relegating their populist rhetoric to a
more ephemeral status (e.g., Betz 1994; 2004; Bornschier 2010; Kitschelt 1995; Mudde
2007; Rydgren 2005). Likewise, Kriesi (2014: 369) argues that the social structural
grievances that populists mobilize are often more intimately related to their more specific
ideologies, rather than the thin ideology of populism.
Indeed, several contributions to this special issue underscore that left and right populism
have distinct determinants of success. The most pertinent cases to test this proposition are
of course those where voters are presented with the alternative of supporting a populist
party of the left or one on the right. Focusing on the Netherlands as such as case,
Akkerman et al. (2017, this issue), show that populist orientations form a coherent set of
beliefs that is not reducible to political distrust, and that the electorates of the
Socialistische Partij (Socialist Party) and the Partij voor de Vrijheid (Party for Freedom)
share.2 At the same time, electorates sort themselves as a function of populist parties’ core
ideology – protectionism, anti-globalization, pro-welfare in the case of the populist left,
and anti-immigration preferences for the populist right. A vote for a populist party in the
Netherlands is not simply a protest vote, but one with a clear mandate. What is more,
where actors link the thin ideology of populism to substantive ideologies, they rarely draw
up fundamentally new dimensions of political competition, but rather reinforce existing
dimensions by occupying more radical positions than mainstream parties do (Bornschier
2010; Kriesi et al. 2008).3
Established theories of party system change emphasize the processes of dealignment and
realignment of specific electoral groups as a consequence of evolving voter demands on the
one hand, and changing party positions on the other (e.g., Bornschier 2010; Dalton et al.
1984; Kitschelt 1994; 1995; Kriesi et al. 2008; Martin 2000; Mayhew 2000; Schattschneider
2 To measure populist attitudes, the authors build on earlier work by Hawkins et al. (2012), and Akkerman et al.
(2014).
3 To add a nuance, populist parties may to some degree transform existing dimensions by altering their
substantive meaning. Thus, the libertarian-authoritarian dimension prevalent in Western Europe as a consequence
of the mobilization of the New Left from the 1970s onwards was transformed by the emergence of the
immigration issue in the 1980s and 1990s, and came to center more strongly on the competing definitions of the
national community (Bornschier 2010: Chap. 1). It is worth noting that almost everywhere, it was the established
center-right parties, and not the radical populist right, that first politicized the immigration issue in the 1980s, as
Ignazi (2003) shows.
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1975 [1960]). Combining this approach with that centering on populism allows us to
distinguish instances where populism catalyzes the mobilization of political outsiders with
strong substantive ideologies from those where populism takes a more “pure” form. Where
populism takes center stage – and almost becomes a “thick ideology”, because references
to other ideologies remain fuzzy or incoherent – the concept of populism is a much more
powerful tool to explain political change than established approaches. The Italian
Movimento Cinque Stelle, which simply refers to “the common citizen”, according to
Ivaldi et al. (2017, this issue), is probably the best example. While still an ephemeral
phenomenon in Western Europe, the recent successes of “center populists” in East-Central
Europe suggest that this party type may be more prevalent elsewhere (Hanley and Sikk
2016; Havlık and Stanley 2015; Havlık and Voda 2016). We might hypothesize that
populism in its pure form becomes a viable tool for mobilization only when
disenchantment with the established parties is more widespread or almost near universal
(Kriesi 2014: 370), or has already led to an erosion of support for the political system
more generally (Doyle 2011; Hawkins 2010).
Greece is a special case in this respect because its main populist party, SYRIZA, stands
clearly on the left. But Andreadis and Stavrakakis (2017, this issue) reveal that for all the
left-wing rhetoric employed by SYRIZA, its voters are aligned with the party primarily in
terms of populist attitudes, and their preferences against austerity and the impositions of
the Troika. While thus having a basis in substantive issue preferences beyond populist
attitudes, the mobilization of SYRIZA transcends general left-right placements, as well as
substantive economic policy, immigration and law and order positions. I will return to the
differences in terms of the ideological distinctiveness of populist parties’ support coalitions
after discussing the demand side of populism and the relationship between populism and
representation.
What Underlies Populist Mobilization?
If it is important not to discard thick ideologies in our attempt to understand populist
mobilization, what do we lose from sight when failing to appreciate what is specific to
populism? Party system scholars tend to focus too much on substantive issue preferences
and their roots in social structure, and to consider everything else as outside the realm of
programmatic politics. The first lesson to learn from populism research is that this
provides an inadequate picture of what electoral choice and recent party system
transformations are about. This is not only illustrated by the examples of “pure” populism
discussed above. Even where voters are driven both by substantive issue preferences and
populist attitudes, the latter are not simply an empty shell that accompanies the former.
The effect of populist attitudes does not disappear when substantive policy preferences are
introduced into models of vote choice, as Akkerman et al. (2017, this issue) analysis
shows. Van Hauwaert and van Kessel (2017) confirm that populist attitudes complement
policy preferences in shaping vote decisions for the populist left and right across several
European countries. Interestingly, they show that populist appeals allow radical parties to
mobilize beyond their core constituency of similarly radical voters.
What, then, moves voters who let populist attitudes shape their electoral behavior? By
incorporating a focus on the demand side of populism, recent scholarship has made
important advances in explaining the correlates and determinants of populist attitudes at
the voter level. Populist voters seem to have a troubled relationship not only with the
political system, but also with their subjective social status. These are two distinct causes
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of populism, but it is also plausible to expect that they are related. Starting with political
disenchantment and distrust, this factor has been evoked early on to explain populist
support, as already discussed. The recent study by Spruyt et al. (2016) shows empirically
that populist attitudes are embedded in deep feelings of discontent. Two contributions to
this special issue delve deeper into the psychological underpinnings of populism. Castanho
Silva et al. (2017, this issue) use an experimental design based on a sample of US citizens
to show that conspiracy beliefs are related to populist worldviews and support for populist
candidates. Although conspiracy beliefs are associated with all elements of the populist
worldview – anti-elitism, people-centrism, and a Manichean worldview – the link to the
one that values the good “common people” is especially strong. The authors theorize that
conspiracy beliefs and populist attitudes have common roots in the belief in the deceptive
nature of authorities.
Who are the populists then? Rico et al. (2017, this issue) show that it is not the worst
off that develop populist attitudes. This result is similar to findings that it is not the most
disadvantaged in terms of income, employment, or economic competition that support the
radical populist right in Europe (Bornschier and Kriesi 2013; Kurer 2017; Mayer 2014; for
a more encompassing review, see Bornschier 2018). By studying the emotional
underpinnings of populism, and showing that anger, and not fear underlie populist
attitudes, Rico et al. (2017, this issue) further nuance recent research that shows that those
who feel relatively deprived – meaning that they feel that they receive less than they
deserve – develop populist worldviews and support populist parties (Elchardus and Spruyt
2012; 2016; Spruyt et al. 2016).4 More specifically, the authors find that of the emotions
elicited by Spain’s economic crisis, some were conductive to populist mobilization, while
other were not. Populism is not the reaction of the hopeless among those who believe that
they do not receive the social recognition they deserve, but of those with internal political
efficacy beliefs, who angrily demand their share from an elite that is seen as self-serving
and unresponsive. As Spruyt et al. (2016: 343) put it, populism is a “hopeful” ideology.
Fear, on the other hand, is associated with conservatism, as Rico et al. (2017, this issue)
note. As the authors underline, future research should focus on the way demand-side
factors conductive to populist mobilization interact with supply-side factors, particular
with the type of populism (left or right) prevalent in the party system. Thus, we have yet
to understand how the individual-level underpinnings of populism interact with thick
ideologies to make some voters support left-wing populism and others right-wing
populism. In fact, in their concluding reflections on this special issue, Hawkins and Rovira
Kaltwasser (2017, this issue) identify the relationship and interaction between populism
and the other ideologies as one of the lacunae in current research in the field.
Party systems scholars have a lot to contribute to models that integrate the demand and
supply sides of party competition. The lesson they have to learn from recent scholarship
on populism is that they may have to amend the social categories they typically look at.
The subjective social categories that populism research has shown to breed populist
attitudes matter just as much as the social structural variables such as class and education
that party system researchers often employ. In fact, it seems most fruitful to study how
4 In combination with prior research, this suggests that relative deprivation predicts both populist attitudes, as
well as individuals’ substantive ideological positions: Teney et al. (2014) show that relative deprivation also
negatively predicts cosmopolitanism and tolerance towards immigrants, and thus relates to the thick ideology the
radical populist right voices in Western Europe.
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class, education, relative deprivation, and lack of political support interact in shaping
voter alignments.
Populism and Representation
Representation failure and the claim of responsiveness lie at the root of populism
(Caramani 2017). This is what populists claim, and many scholars concur in identifying
mainstream parties’ lack of responsiveness to voter preferences or even party system
“cartelization” (Katz and Mair 1995) as the main cause of populist success – as mentioned
at the outset of this introduction. Interestingly, this proposition has almost never been
rigorously tested empirically. One of the difficulties involved is finding a yardstick to assess
whether representation before the appearance of populist challengers was good or bad,
and for which segments of the electorate, an issue I will return to later.
What is possible, on the other hand, is to study whether populists fulfill their promise to
re-establish the “will of the people”. Several contributions to this special issue provide
significant advances in our understanding of populism and representation. In an analysis
covering all European countries, Huber and Ruth (2017, this issue) investigate whether
populists honor their claim to bring politics closer to the people, thereby increasing
political participation, and to close the representation gap by improving the ideological
congruence between parties and voters. Their findings for left and right populists are
nuanced: While the former improve the overall quality of representation in party systems,
the latter make participation more equal in terms of status by bringing people (back) into
politics. Andreadis and Stavrakakis (2017, this issue), on the other hand, use populism as
a substantive dimension along others to measure ideological congruence between parties
and voters. As noted earlier, the populism dimension together with the anti-EU/anti-
Troika dimension are pivotal in Greece and it is along these dimensions that both
SYRIZA and the Independent Greeks (ANEL) are aligned with their respective voters,
accounting for the unlikely government coalition between the far left and the far right.
SYRIZA voters are not well represented on other substantive dimensions such as
economic policy, begging the question of how enduring an alignment based exclusively on
populism and national sovereignty may be.
The Swiss case is instructive here. Ostracism on the part of the established parties towards
new contenders is uncommon in this country, and populists thus attain governing power
more easily than elsewhere. Nonetheless, as Bernhard (2017, this issue) shows, the three
radical populist right parties present in Switzerland – the Swiss People’s Party (SVP), the
Lega dei Ticinesi, and the Geneva Citizens’ Movement – clearly exhibit a populist profile and
continue to do so even after entering regional or even national government. Bernhard’s fine-
grained analysis reveals a “division of roles” in which politicians from populist parties that
occupy positions of government may hardly use populist rhetoric, while prominent
oppositional figures from these same parties continue to do so very strongly.
To the degree that populism triggers strong reactions from parties defending liberal or
pluralist conceptions of democracy, populism may give rise to a relatively enduring regime
dimension. Different from the regime dimensions in several Latin American countries with
their legacies of military rule (Hawkins et al. 2010; Moreno 1999), the regime dimension
triggered by populism is not simply about more or less democracy. Rather, it mirrors a
conflict about different conceptions of democracy. Liberal democracy balances vertical
accountability between citizens and representatives against liberal freedom rights,
horizontal accountability and the rule of law (Dahl 1971; 1989). Populists privilege vertical
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accountability or even proclaim it to be the only relevant standard, and thus adhere to a
“radical” (Rovira Kaltwasser 2012), or strongly majoritarian approach to democracy
(Caramani 2017). Under the effect of the radical populist right in Europe, populism may
become an enduring feature of politics because the antagonism between liberal democracy
and radical plebiscitarian democracy maps quite neatly onto the conflict between
universalistic as opposed to traditionalist-communitarian values that these parties thrive
on (see Bornschier 2010: Chap. 1). Left-wing populism, on the other hand, is associated
with the traditional economic state-market dimension, and may prove resilient either in an
infinite battle against the mainstream left that is accused of adhering to the neo-liberal
consensus and having abandoned Socialism, or in oppositions against the European Union
and the global economy. At least in the cases studied by Ivaldi et al. (2017, this issue),
despite their otherwise distinctive ideological profiles, left and right-wing populists have
actually converged in depicting banks, corporations, financial institutions, and the EU as
part of an elite that betrays the economic interests of the people.
Because of the existence of contrasting conceptions of democracy and the potentially
uneasy relationship between the sub-components of liberal democracy, the relationship
between populism and democracy is also ambivalent (Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser
2017, this issue). One factor that matters in determining whether populism is “a threat or
a corrective to democracy” (Rovira Kaltwasser 2012) is whether populists actually govern.
For Latin America, empirical research shows that populist actors in opposition have a
positive influence on the quality of democracy, while their influence is negative when they
are in government (Huber and Schimpf 2016). More specifically, Ruth (2017) reveals an
erosion of horizontal accountability in Latin America as populists have reached the
presidency (see also Houle and Kenny 2016).
Are there Persistent Differences between Types of Populism?
Contrary to the thesis of a “populist Zeitgeist” (Mudde 2004), which is widely shared in
academic publics in Europe as well as in the media, populism at least until recently has
not been contagious: Mainstream parties have not become more populist in Western
Europe, and the newspapers seen to curb populist discourses, rather than amplifying them,
as Manucci and Weber (2017, this issue) find. Populism comes in waves, and waves also
recede, thus there is no secular trend towards populism. In their reflections on this special
issue, Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser (2017, this issue) maintain that this is one of the
productive conclusions that grow out of the ideational approach to populism.
In most of Western Europe, populism remains confined to radical parties of the left and
right that reach sizable vote shares, but not majority status – contrary to populist parties
or presidential candidates in Latin America and elsewhere. Indeed, a characteristic that
sets right-wing populists in Western Europe apart from left-wing populists in Latin
America is that, despite the similarities in their discourses, their support coalition differs
dramatically. The radical populist right in Europe is firmly rooted in social structure (e.g.,
Bornschier and Kriesi 2013; Minkenberg and Perrineau 2007; Oesch 2013), and rallies an
electorate that closely mirrors the substantive ideology of these parties themselves
(Bornschier 2010). The appeal of the populist right, in other words, is restricted to rather
specific segments of the electorate whose anti-universalistic preferences were not
represented prior to the breakthrough of the populist right, and these electoral segments
perceived a failure of democratic representation. In countries such as Venezuela, Greece,
Italy, and perhaps Spain, the legitimacy gap is far wider. Even more so than what
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Andreadis and Stavrakakis (2017, this issue) find for Greece, the electorate of the left-wing
populist Bolivarian movement in Venezuela is extremely incoherent in terms of substantive
ideology, suggesting that these voters are united by little more than their rejection of the
political establishment (Bornschier forthcoming; Hawkins 2010).
One type of populism, exemplified by the radical populist right in Western Europe, thus
has the capacity to improve representation by representing the substantive policy
preferences of its voters. I propose to call this type “segmented populism” due to the very
specific electoral groups it rallies in ideological and social structural terms. The other type
may be called “majoritarian populism”, because it encompasses much more diverse
groups. Almost by definition, the latter type cannot improve the congruence between
parties and voters because of the divergent policy preferences or lack clear preferences that
the populist coalition encompasses (for a more extended version of this argument, see
Bornschier forthcoming).
This points to the existence of different types of populism, whose consequences for the
representation of substantive policy preferences differ profoundly. To grasp these
differences, the ideational approach to populism should be brought into fruitful dialogue
with more established theories of party system change such as cleavage theory and the
concepts of dealignment and realignment (Bornschier forthcoming; Hawkins and Rovira
Kaltwasser 2017, this issue; Roberts 2015). As this introduction has sought to show, the
contributions to this special issue help us to make important steps in this direction. They
do so by illuminating the relationship between populism and other ideological features
that populists exhibit over space and time, by developing tools to establish commonalities
and differences across countries in terms of demand side of populism, and by assessing the
relationship between populism and representation.
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